Notes from Howard Rachlin’s “Science of Self-Control” (2000)

Notes from Introduction

Humans have the ability to perceive a pattern of facts as a single, abstract entity. Self-control, therefore, simply involves allocating a pattern of behavior to the delivery of a later, larger reinforcer, as opposed to a sooner, smaller reinforcer. (p. 3)

The pattern of saving nuts emerges in the behavior of the squirrel from every instinctual instance where it has to hide nuts. In the same vein, the pattern of alcoholism emerges in the choice to drink at every instance the opportunity is presented. Just like the squirrel who doesn’t choose to be a saver; the alcoholic does not choose to be one (p. 4).

Notes from Chapter 1: Habit and Willpower

Teleological behaviorism (Rachlin’s paradigm) does not distinguish inner life from life. Rather, all of life is acted out as overt behavior. (p. 19). That said, I cannot agree that there is no difference between private and public events. The skin does make a difference!

Mental life is simply patterns of behavior extending into the past and the future (p. 19). Mental events are perceptible patterns of overt behavior just like a movement within a symphony or ballet (p. 19). Within some time range, interobserver agreement can be obtained for the history of an observable behavior. Future behavioral patterns may be predicted, but not perceived by external observers until it happens. If mental life comprises of private events extending into the past and the future, then it has a dimension not present in observable behavior – time in mental life is at least bidirectional. This sounds like LaMettrie’s materialist monism. 

Notes from Chapter 2: Simple Ambivalence

None publicly posted.

Notes from Chapter 3: Complex Ambivalence

Simple ambivalence involves a choice between two clearly defined alternatives, while complex ambivalence involves a choice between one clearly defined alternative (usually the temptation, e.g., drinking or using drugs now) and a vaguely defined, abstract state (e.g., the state of wellbeing or sobriety) (p. 58)

In teleological behaviorism, the best predictor of future patterns of behavior is not through introspection, but in the observation of patterns of past behavior. (p. 66). Friends, relatives and other people in one’s social circle are the best mirrors for identifying patterns of past behavior. As a consequence, they are able to understand the behavioral context of an individual engaged in a particular activity. (p. 66). This is similar to my concept of Adullam Ring or cognitive science’s conception of cognition as embodied in the environment, social environment in this case. Outsight is better than Insight because extended patterns of behavior over time are no longer discrete and well-defined for the individual.

People prefer to be rewarded, rather than merely escape punishment. As a result, people are motivated to exchange negative reinforcement (e.g., continual drinking by the alcoholic) for positive reinforcement (e.g., engaged in non-drinking activities). This explains why alcoholics might want to quit after entering the alcoholism stable state. In this state, alcoholism becomes the abstract, temporally extended state, while “not drinking” becomes the discrete, well-defined event where positive reinforcement can occur. However, with time, the individual gets to the sobriety stable state where every instance of “not drinking” becomes negatively reinforcing, i.e., merely avoiding pain. As a result, the individual engages in the well-defined event of “drinking” where positive reinforcement can occur. Then the journey down the primrose path starts again. (p. 78-79)

Notes from Chapter 4: The Lonely Addict

Expected Utility Theory assumes that the consumer’s time horizon is infinite and the consequences of all choices in the present and future are considered before a choice is made. However, based on psychological realism, reinforcers and punishers are both discounted by time/delay (p. 82-83).

Consumption of addictive goods can have harmful effects on future consumption. In addition, consumption of addictive goods reduces the net utility of a fixed amount of that good. This necessitates the consumption of an increased amount of the good to attain the same level of utility (p. 85).

Tolerance is the negative effect of a person’s stock of an addictive substance on utility Stock = body and environment’s memories of consumption. Stock increases with consumption and decreases with time. If addictive and nonaddictive activities are seen as alternatives, increase in one activity will increase its stock and decrease the stock of the other activity (p. 85-87).

Negative effect of present consumption on future local utility is price habituation (p. 87).

Consumption of some activities, e.g., learning skills or social skills, increases future local utility (p. 87).

Positive effect of present consumption on future local utility is price sensitization (p. 88).

It appears that social interaction is price sensitized, i.e., the more it is performed, the cheaper it gets; the less it is performed, the more expensive it gets. (p. 100). Addictive behavior, e.g., smoking or alcohol consumption, is price habituated, i.e., the more it is performed, the more expensive it gets (you need more quantities to attain the same level of utility/satisfaction) (p. 101). Sometimes, an addictive activity becomes instrumental for obtaining social support, i.e., the individual drinks in order to reduce the cost of social support (p. 102).

Notes from Chapter 5: Soft Commitment

The initiation of a gestalt of behavior whose interruption is costly is also a commitment to its completion. This is called soft commitment because there is a way out. (p. 109). Credit card companies understand this with attaching penalties to when payments are defaulted.

Initial components of a gestalt of behavior patterns are not sunk costs, but rather, investment in the individual’s stock (Stock = body and environment’s memories of consumption [p. 85]). In other words, components of a gestalt of behavior are economic complements (p. 116). This is a good conceptualization introduced by Rachlin. Rather than limiting complements to different reinforcers that must be consumed together to obtain utility from them, Rachlin treats each allocation of behavior to the same reinforcers across time as complements.

In teleological behaviorism, there is no delineation between cognition and motivation. True knowledge is more than the repetition/verbalization of rules (as evidenced in the two experiments). To know a rule is to act in a way that is consistent with it (p. 125).

By committing to a behavioral pattern leading to a larger, later reward (LLR), the individual is reducing future options and potential variability of future behavior (p. 125). The pattern of behaviors that constitute self-monitoring introduces a wider temporal context. This overwhelms the discrete, narrow time associated with smaller, sooner reward (SSRs).

Experimental example with smokers asked to limit the variability in the number of cigarettes they smoked. By trying to reduce variability, the smokers reduced the amount of cigarettes they smoked. This is due to restructuring, where attention shifted from the few minutes smoking takes, to the larger behavioral context of self-monitoring for a week (p. 126-127).

Notes from Chapter 6: Rules and Probability

Desires are situational, i.e., cravings are not in the individual, but dependent on where the individual is. Discriminative stimulus is a situation or stimulus that signals the operation of a certain contingency of reinforcement (p. 130).

Just as organisms tend to prefer SSRs to LLRs, they also prefer small certain reinforcers to larger probabilistic ones. (p. 153). This is the essence of Prospect Theory’s subjective evaluation of value depending on their probabilities.

Notes from Chapter 7: Self-control and Social Cooperation

Social cooperation is to social defection what individual self-control is to individual impulsiveness (p. 168).

Cooperation is not dependent on either absolute probability or subjective probability. Rather, it is dependent on relative/conditional probability, i.e., what is the probability of others (or future “me”) cooperating, given that I cooperate. (p. 178 – 179).

For an individual struggling with addictive activities, a lifetime of relapse has reduced the probability of his current self cooperating with his future self. As a result, the future self defects too and will not be able to cooperate with the current self (p. 179).

A single person in successive moments in time, ranging from past to present, is like a person in a group of other people (Fig 7.7). The different persons have the same skin, thus, they have a common interest. Good habits and LLRs benefit the individual over time, even though there might be some sacrifice in the present (t = 0) (p. 187). Rachlin introduces this prisoner dilemma game ongoing between the person in the present time and the future time. Goal of self-control is to encourage cooperation between self in the present and self in the future.

In Richard Price’s novel, Clockers (1992), ghetto environments have short-term social interactions dominating long term ones. SSRs overwhelm LLRs and everyone’s self-concept is narrow in time; controlled by the clock, rather than the calendar.